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学者们讨论权利的进路有两种:概念式的和理论式的。概念式的方法具有明显的本质主义倾向,但本质主义的基础已不存在。理论式的方法也不令人满意:或者是不能对现有的制度现象进行有效的解释,表现为不具可验证性;或不能对现有的制度效果提供科学评估的手段,表现为不具可操作性。本文借助“资源”这一核心术语,试图构造一个实证的权利理论。通过更具经验性的“成本”一词对权利的实际运作进行了论证,并在此基础上认为,权利不是一个实体性的而是一个关系性的概念。最后对现有的法学研究方法进行了反思,而这是导致现有权利理论不足的重要缘由之一。
There are two kinds of scholars’ approaches to discussing rights: conceptual and theoretical. Conceptual methods have a clear tendency towards essentialism, but the basis of essentialism no longer exists. The theoretical approach is also unsatisfactory: either an inability to interpret existing institutional phenomena effectively, an unverifiable measure, or a means of failing to provide a scientific assessment of the effects of existing institutions, as non-actionable Sex. This article attempts to construct an empirical theory of rights by using the core term of “resources”. Through the more empirical “cost” of the actual operation of the rights of the argument, and on the basis of that, the right is not a substantive but a relational concept. Finally, the existing research methods of law are rethought, and this is one of the important reasons leading to the lack of existing rights theory.