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建立了发电市场迭代竞价模型。该模型在竞价过程中给出了充分的市场信息 ,发电商可以合理、经济地组织生产 ,确定竞标策略。电力购买者赋予了议价能力 ,协调各厂商竞价 ,促使市场高效地运作。实例模拟表明 ,在完全竞争的市场环境下 ,各厂商的发电资源可以得到充分利用 ,市场处于Nash均衡 ,出清价收敛于传统的系统边际成本附近 ,发电系统接近于经济运行状态。比较了迭代竞价机制与单轮投标机制的市场效率。模拟了发电商串通行为的形成 ,为此有必要制定有效的规则对市场竞价加以约束。
An iterative bidding model for power generation market is established. The model gives sufficient market information in the bidding process, and power producers can organize their production rationally and economically to determine the bidding strategy. Power buyers have given the bargaining power to coordinate the bidding of various manufacturers to promote the efficient operation of the market. The simulation results show that in a perfectly competitive market environment, the power generation resources of various manufacturers can be fully utilized, the market is in Nash equilibrium, the clearing price converges to the traditional marginal cost of the system, and the power generation system is close to the economic operation. The iterative bidding mechanism and the market efficiency of single round bidding mechanism are compared. It simulates the formation of collusion between power producers. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate effective rules to restrain market bidding.