不良贷款数额巨大、占比高已成为困扰国有商业银行改革和发展的一个严重问题。为了从严防范信贷风险,国有商业银行实施零不良率、不良贷款“问责制”以及信贷人员责任终身追究等严格的信贷约束政策, 使得经济活动中的“惜贷”现象成为信贷人员与银行信贷管理政策之间博弈的一种均衡结果。因此, 选择适度风险范围内的非零不良贷款率, 建立健全与约束机制相对等的正向激励机制应是国有商业银行防范金融风险、提高效益的客观政策选择。 The huge amount and high proportion of non-performing loans have become a serious problem distressing the reform and development of state-owned commercial banks. In order to strictly guard against credit risks, state-owned commercial banks have implemented stringent credit restriction policies such as zero non-performing loan ratio, non-performing loan “accountability system” and lifelong investigation on the responsibilities of credit officers, thus making the “pity loans” phenomenon in economic activities become the credit officers and banks A balanced result of the game between credit management policies. Therefore, choosing a non-zero NPL ratio within a reasonable risk range and establishing a positive incentive mechanism that is relatively equal to the binding mechanism should be an objective policy option for state-owned commercial banks to prevent financial risks and increase profits.