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是否应显示竞争对手的价格对比性信息一直是困扰网络商店的一个问题。考虑到网络商店显示竞争对手的价格信息对顾客信任以及顾客信任对消费者效用的影响,本文以商店声誉、商品价格和顾客信任为变量建立消费者效用模型,运用博弈方法进行模型分析,探讨网络商店是否应显示竞争对手价格对比性信息的策略选择问题。研究发现,不同经营导向和不同声誉的网络商店应选择不同的显示策略,即:以市场份额为导向时,同质商店可以维持现有显示策略;而异质商店可根据现有显示情况做出策略调整;以商店收益为导向时,同质商店都倾向于显示的策略,异质商店倾向于在各自需求优势下定相对较高价格的策略;以消费者剩余为导向时,同质商店可维持现有显示策略,异质商店中具有声誉优势的一方和不具有声誉优势的一方分别倾向于双方都显示和只有一方显示的策略。
Whether competitive prices should be displayed Contrast information has always been a problem bothering online shops. Considering the impact of online store’s display of competitor’s price information on customer trust and customer trust on consumer utility, this paper constructs a consumer utility model based on store reputation, product price and customer trust as variables, and uses game theory to analyze the model, The question of whether the store should display competitor price contrast information on strategy choice. The study finds that online shops with different business orientation and different reputation should choose different display strategies, ie, homogeneity stores can maintain the existing display strategies when they are market-oriented, while heterogeneous stores can make the display according to the existing situation Strategy adjustment; homogeneity stores tend to show strategies when oriented to store revenue, heterogeneous stores tend to set relatively higher price strategies under their own demand advantages; homogeneity stores can be maintained with consumer surplus as the orientation Existing display strategies, reputational parties in a heterogeneous store, and non-reputable parties tend to favor a strategy where both parties display and only one party shows.