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地方政府公职人员在职消费过快增长一直是困扰政府治理的一个难题,而政府治理结构改革是解决这一问题的有效途径。作为一项重要的政府治理结构改革,财政“省直管县”改革会改变县级政府的激励和约束:一方面,财政“省直管县”改革后县级政府收入分成的提高会加强县级政府之间的财政竞争;另一方面,在财政关系上减少一级政府会影响上级政府对县级政府的财政监督和管理。这种激励和约束的改变能否有效抑制基层公职人员的在职消费需要进一步实证检验。本文使用中国县级财政经济统计数据对财政“省直管县”改革与基层公职人员在职消费之间的关系进行实证研究。研究发现:财政“省直管县”改革使得县域人均行政管理费显著降低了约5%,使行政管理费支出占总财政支出的比重显著降低了约0.583%。
The excessively rapid growth of on-the-job public officials in local governments has always been a problem that plagues government governance. The reform of government governance structure is an effective way to solve this problem. As an important reform of government governance structure, the reform of finance and “provincial direct management” will change the incentives and restraints of county governments: on the one hand, the fiscal revenue of county-level governments On the other hand, reducing the level I government in the fiscal relationship will affect the superior government’s financial supervision and management at the county level. Whether such changes in incentives and restraints can effectively curb the on-the-job consumption of grassroots public officials needs further empirical tests. This paper uses China’s county-level financial and economic statistics to make an empirical study on the relationship between the fiscal reform of “provincial direct counties” and on-the-job consumption of grassroots public officials. The study found that the fiscal reform of “provincial direct counties” significantly reduced the per capita administrative costs in the county by about 5%, and significantly reduced the share of administrative expenses in total expenditures by about 0.583%.