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本文重点从中国公司独特的股权结构、股东大会失灵、董事会失灵和机构投资者的势力日益强大等方面分析了独立董事制度在中国兴起的原因；并从信息、时间、独立性、预算等方面对独立董事制度进行了效率约束分析；从声誉、报酬、法律、控制权方面研究了激励机制的设计问题；在此基础上提出确保独立董事制度有效运行的制度安排。
This article focuses on the reasons for the rise of independent director system in China from aspects of unique ownership structure of Chinese companies, failure of general meeting of shareholders, failure of the board of directors and growing power of institutional investors. It also analyzes the reasons for the rise of independent directors in China from information, time, independence and budget Independent director system carries on the analysis of the efficiency restriction; studies the design of incentive mechanism from reputation, reward, law and control; on this basis, puts forward the institutional arrangement to ensure the effective operation of independent director system.