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本文指出了中国背景下公司的内部治理机制与其变更审计师决定的联系。我们在此讨论两种审计师变更,即转聘较大的审计师事务所和转聘较小的审计师事务所。我们检验了2001年至2004年中国股市持续低迷阶段公司内部治理机制对公司审计师变更的影响。实证结果表明,控股股东持股较多或董事会主席和首席执行官由同一人担任的公司更可能转聘较小的审计师事务所。我们未发现监事会对审计师变更产生显著的影响。这一研究结果说明,一般情况下,内部治理机制薄弱的公司倾向于转聘较小而可能更顺从的审计师,以维持从较弱的公司治理实务中获取的“不透明收益”。
This paper points out the relationship between the company’s internal governance mechanism and its decision to change the auditor in the context of China. We discuss two types of auditor changes here, namely the transfer of larger auditor firms and the transfer of smaller auditor firms. We examined the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on corporate auditor changes during the period of continuous downturn in China’s stock market from 2001 to 2004. The empirical results show that a company with a controlling shareholder holding more shares or a chairman and CEO of the same person is more likely to transfer a smaller auditor firm. We did not find that the board of supervisors had a significant impact on auditor changes. The results of this study indicate that, in general, companies with weak internal governance tend to switch to smaller and potentially more obedient auditors to maintain “opacity gains” from weaker corporate governance practices.