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以2007-2014年沪深A股上市的重污染行业的公司为研究对象,构建交互效应模型,实证检验了环境规制对技术创新的影响,以及高管激励与环境规制交互效应对技术创新的影响。研究结果发现环境规制对技术创新有显著的促进作用,但是这种促进作用在国有企业以及非东部地区企业中并不明显,表明波特假说的成立有一定的条件。其次,高管短期薪酬与环境规制的交互作用、高管持股比例与环境规制的交互作用对技术创新均存在正向作用。而高管在职消费仅在东部地区企业中增强波特假说的有效性。
Taking the heavily polluting industries companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares for 2007-2014 as the research objects, this paper constructs the interaction effect model, and empirically tests the impact of environmental regulation on technological innovation and the impact of the interaction between executive incentive and environmental regulation on technological innovation . The findings show that environmental regulation has a significant role in promoting technological innovation. However, this promotion effect is not obvious in state-owned enterprises and non-eastern-based enterprises, indicating that the establishment of the Porter Hypothesis has certain conditions. Second, the interaction between short-term compensation of executives and environmental regulation, the interaction between executive shareholding ratio and environmental regulation have a positive effect on technological innovation. While on-the-job consumption of senior executives only enhances the effectiveness of the Porter hypothesis among enterprises in the eastern region.