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本文以2006-2013年沪深两地上市公司为研究样本,采用部分可观测Bivariate Probit模型来考察产品市场竞争对公司违规(含违规倾向和违规稽查)的影响。实证结果表明:产品市场竞争对公司违规行为具有“诱发”效果,即公司所处行业的产品市场竞争程度越高,则公司的违规倾向越高,其违规行为被稽查的可能性却越低;产品市场竞争对公司违规的“诱发”效果在经营违规中表现得更加明显。进一步的研究发现,市场监管环境的改进对上述的“诱发”效果存在着一定的积极调节作用,但是整体上还有较大改进空间。本文的研究结论对于有效治理公司违规行为具有一定的政策借鉴意义。
Based on the sample of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2013, this paper uses the partially observable Bivariate Probit model to investigate the impact of product market competition on company non-compliance (including non-compliance tendency and non-compliance audit). The empirical results show that: the product market competition has the effect of “inducing” to the company’s non-compliance, that is, the higher the market competition in the company’s industry, the higher the company’s non-compliance tendency and the more likely it is to be audited Low; product market competition on the company’s “induced” effect of violations in the business more evident. Further study found that the improvement of the market regulatory environment has some positive regulatory effect on the “induced ” effect mentioned above, but there is still much room for improvement on the whole. The conclusions of this paper have some policy implications for the effective governance of corporate non-compliance.