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文章主要是在演化博弈理论的利用之下将营销渠道企业之间合作的模型构建出来。通过一系列的研究我们能够发现,当外界的影响因素是零时,收益会在新渠道关系模式的影响下表现出普遍递增的态势,此时的系统演化能够被看成是双方完全合作的过程,一旦收益无法表现出普遍递增的趋势,那么系统演化则是双方不合作过程;当外界的影响因素非零时,在较强的法律监督机制的影响下,可能出现在合作过程中的机会主义倾向会被有效抑制,这样以来企业之间就能够稳定性、长期新的进行合作了。
The article builds the model of cooperation between marketing channel enterprises under the utilization of evolutionary game theory. Through a series of researches, we can find that when the influence factor of the outside world is zero, the return will generally increase under the influence of the new channel relationship mode. At this time, the system evolution can be regarded as the process of complete cooperation between the two parties , Once the return can not show the trend of universal increase, then the evolution of the system is the process of non-cooperation between the two parties. When the influence factors of the outside world are non-zero, under the influence of strong legal supervision mechanism, opportunism may appear in the cooperation process Tendencies will be effectively suppressed, and as a result, stability will be maintained among enterprises and new long-term cooperation will be made.