We propose a game-theoretic model for a first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB auction) of standing timber. A FPSB auction means that bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the submitted price. The mathematical model has been elaborated considering only two bidders. Each bidder is supposed to know only the probability distribution of the bid of the other bidder. Using appropriate distributions, the adversity and propensity of a bidder to risk can be described. From the view point of a bidder, the conservative solution is calculated for both types of the other bidder. If a standing timber belongs to a public owner, the market has to follow a public evidence procedure, including public auctions. The function obtained is illustrated with a numerical example of a typical standing timber auction from a forest located in central Italy. Considering average costs and prices of the local chestnut timber market, winning bids and expected gains are estimated. Their amounts are comparable with the currently average stumpage price registered in this market. We propose a game-theoretic model for a first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB auction) of standing timber. A FPSB auction means that bidders simultaneously submit sealed sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the submitted price. The mathematical model has been elaborated considering only two bidders. Each bidder is supposed to know only the probability distribution of the bid of the other bidder. From the view point of a bidder, the conservative solution is calculated for both types of the other bidder. with a numerical example of a typical standing timber auction from a forest located in central Italy. inning bids and expected gains are estimated. Their amounts are comparable with the currently average stumpage price registered in this market.