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本文通过手工收集的数据,实证检验了我国上市公司章程中反收购条款的设置与公司代理成本之闻的关系。研究结果表明,从整体来讲,金色降落伞条款的设立是对公司管理层的一种保护,不利于投资者利益的保护。公司治理对金色降落伞条款的效应有影响:民营企业设立金色降落伞条款,不利于降低代理成本。但前十大股东持股比例越高,设定金色降落伞条款越不利于降低代理成本。限制提名董事人选的股东资格条教、交错董事会条款、绝对多数条款对于降低上市公司代理成本没有显著的影响。本文的研究结论为法与金融文献提供了公司层面的法律规章同样对投资者利益保护有影响的我国上市公司的经验证据,也将促使我国理论界、立法机构和监管部门重新思考公司层面的法律规章的合理性和可能存在的问题。
This article empirically tests the relationship between the setting of anti-acquisition clause and the agency cost of the company in the articles of association of listed companies in our country through the manual collection of data. The results show that, as a whole, the establishment of the provisions of the golden parachute is a kind of protection for the company’s management, is not conducive to the protection of the interests of investors. Corporate governance has an effect on the effect of the golden parachute clauses: the provision of golden parachutes by private enterprises is not conducive to reducing agency costs. However, the higher the proportion of shares held by the top ten shareholders, the more difficult to set the golden parachute clause to reduce agency costs. Limiting the qualification of nominees for directorships requires that the terms of directors be staggered and the absolute majority of clauses have no significant effect on reducing the agency costs of listed companies. The conclusion of this article provides empirical evidence for the legal and financial documents at the company level, which also affects the protection of investors’ interests, and will also urge the theoretical circles, legislatures and regulators in our country to rethink the laws at the company level Regulatory rationale and possible problems.