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在常识态度中,人们对于自我的实在性具有十分自然的直觉,笛卡尔的实体自我理论在哲学层面也具有深远影响。然而历史上却从来不乏学者质疑自我的实在性、将其视作一个“幻觉”。本文首先介绍三种具有代表性的关于自我的反实在论:休谟的经验主义反实在论,来自当代脑科学研究成果的反实在论,以及丹尼特的反实在论。然后依次回应这些挑战,捍卫自我的本体论地位。最后在此基础上对自我实在性之争做出评述。
In the common sense attitude, people have a very natural intuition about the reality of self, and Descartes’s entity-self theory also has far-reaching philosophical implications. However, historically, there have been no shortage of scholars questioning the reality of the ego as an “illusion.” This article first introduces three representative anti-realisms about self: Hume’s empirical anti-realism, anti-realism from contemporary brain science research, and Dennett’s anti-realism. Then in turn respond to these challenges and defend the ontological status of self. Finally, on this basis, make a commentary on the dispute of self-actuality.