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陈金钊教授倡言把法律作为修辞,以对抗当下我国过于强大的政治修辞、道德修辞。该观点虽有一定的积极意义,但其论述的“法律修辞”是一个歧义性概念:把法律作为言语论辩技巧意义上的语言修辞,混淆了法律思维本身与对法律思维的表达;把法律作为论证模式、为结论的可接受性提供说服力的论证修辞,赋予了法律修辞太高的期待。法律修辞或然性推理的逻辑基础、达成主体间合意的路径以及可接受性的评价标准的特点,理论上是对经典法治的反动,实践中因为法律修辞的泛化和滥用而具有背离法治目标的倾向。因此,法律修辞只能是辅助性的法律方法。法律修辞的限度是逻辑,只有将法律修辞限制于逻辑范围,在合理(逻辑)性、合法性的基础上,可接受性才有意义,过度地强调可接受性很有可能将法治导入歧途。
Professor Chen Jinzhao advocated using law as a rhetoric to counter the current overly powerful political rhetoric and moral rhetoric in our country. Although this view has some positive meanings, the “rhetoric of law” it discusses is an ambiguous concept: using law as the language rhetoric in the language argumentative skill, confusing the expression of legal thinking itself and thinking of law; Law as a mode of argument provides persuasive argument rhetoric for the acceptability of the conclusion, giving the rhetoric of law too high expectation. The logical basis of legal rhetoric and reasoning reasoning, the path of reaching the intension of the subject and the evaluation criteria of acceptability are theoretically the reactionary to the classical rule of law. In practice, because of the generalization and abuse of legal rhetoric, Propensity. Therefore, legal rhetoric can only be auxiliary legal method. The limit of legal rhetoric is logic. Only when the legal rhetoric is limited to the logical range, acceptability is meaningful based on reasonable (logical) and legal basis. Too much emphasis on acceptability is likely to lead the rule of law astray.