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运用法伯的最后要价仲裁思想,以我国首次铁路春运价格听证为例,对价格听证博弈作了模型描述和扩展解释。认为价格听证获得成功的关键,要看价格听证中博弈双方对价格的呼声是否达到纳什均衡;今后的价格听证会应从仲裁主体、仲裁程序等方面进行规范。
Using Farber’s last asking price arbitration theory, taking the first hearing of the price of railway spring transport in China as an example, this paper gives a model description and extended explanation of the price hearing game. The key to successful price hearing depends on whether the price of the game on both sides of the price hearing reaches the Nash equilibrium. The price hearing in the future should be regulated from the aspects of the arbitration subject and the arbitration procedure.