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随着风电等间歇式能源并网,自动发电控制(AGC)过程中将出现越来越多的区域间功率支援,而各区域都不愿付出过多的调节代价,如机组磨损、额外燃料消耗、偏离经济调度下的运行点造成的损失。解决其间的博弈困局,制定有说服力、稳定的协调运行方案,是调动全网调频资源共同消纳间歇式能源的前提。文中利用微分博弈理论对该问题进行建模并求解,使博弈达到非合作反馈纳什均衡点。在两区域AGC模型上的仿真结果显示,与比例—积分控制和最优控制不同,所提的协调控制策略能保证被各区域自愿、忠实地执行,因为单独改变策略将导致收益下降。
With the interconnection of intermittent energy sources such as wind power, more and more inter-regional power support will emerge during the automatic generation control (AGC) process, and all regions are reluctant to pay excessive regulatory costs such as unit wear and tear, extra fuel consumption , Deviate from the loss caused by the operating point under the economic dispatch. To solve the game of the dilemma during the development of a convincing and stable coordinated operation of the program is to mobilize the entire network to jointly adjust the frequency of intermittent energy resources to meet the premise. In this paper, differential game theory is used to model and solve the problem so that the game reaches non-cooperative Nash equilibrium point. The simulation results on the two-region AGC model show that, different from the proportional-integral control and the optimal control, the proposed coordinated control strategy can ensure the voluntary and faithful implementation of each region because the change of strategy alone will lead to the decrease of revenue.