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When Syrian government troops retook the ancient city of Palmyra on March 27 from the so-called “Islamic State” extremist group （ISIS）， much of the credit for weakening the terrorist group was given to an unlikely party—Russia. Having just withdrawn its forces from Syria 12 days prior， its involvement was seen as a game changer on the ground， even if many of its firepower came—some say indiscriminately—from the air.
Russia’s interests in fighting terrorism in Syria coincided with American interests writ large， and were recognized in a visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on March 24， his third in 10 months. According to Russian state media， the head of the nation’s Foreign Affairs Committee Alexei Pushkov tweeted at the conclusion of the visit： “There’s nothing more powerful in politics than need. Under its influence， forgetting about isolating Russia， the United States has begun to move.”
But Russia’s efforts in Syria also dovetailed with the preferences of its neighbor， China， who too is taking stock of their bilateral relations and evaluating prospects for closer ties. External observers often tie China and Russia together given the close relationship of their current leaders， their communist history， and their regularly shared positions on issues before the United Nations Security Council. Yet their relationship is anything but straightforward， given the complicated set of circumstances in which the two powers evaluate the trade-offs of working closely together.
In short， China-Russia relations do not exist in a vacuum. The intense atmospherics of geopolitics and economic affairs weighs heavily on the tone and tune， creating an endless ebb and flow of “warming” and“cooling，” coordination and collaboration. While China and Russia have clear opportunities to work together， the relationship will continue to be defined by what one can offer the other.
Coordination and trade
A critical development in the China-Russia relationship over the last three years is the “bromance” between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart， Vladimir Putin. It is a relationship defined by respect， exchange， and a strict adherence to non-intervention in the other’s affairs.
Last September， Putin stood in Tiananmen Square in Beijing with other world leaders to watch an elaborate military parade. This included the participation of Russian troops， marking the 70th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War， also called World War II. Just a few months before， Xi had been in Red Square in Moscow with troops from the People’s Liberation Army to mark the anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Putin has already announced his intention to visit China again in 2016. Additionally， the two leaders have conducted extensive energy and economic deals， and closely coordinated their respective positions on topics at the United Nations. They also share the aim of reforming the international governance system. To date， however， the affection between Xi and Putin has yet to translate into a permanent change in the bilateral relationship of the kind some expected.
Today the area in which the two states are most closely linked is by trade， specifically the export of Russian raw materials to China， including： traditional commodities such as oil and metal， hefty military equipment， and increasingly， natural gas and data storage capacity. While China provides a tremendous market for Russia’s exports， Russia also serves as a large market for many “made-in-China” products.
Yet the Sino-Russian trade relationship took a massive hit in 2015， when exports from the former to the latter fell year on year by more than a third， to $32.9 billion， while imports from Russia declined by nearly a fifth to $31.4 billion， a Chinese Customs Department spokesperson， Huang Songping， said in a press conference on January 13.
Despite the significant drop， China continued to be Russia’s largest trading partner in 2015， and trade volume between them could begin increasing on a yearly basis in 2016， a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Commerce said on January 6. “The foundation of ChinaRussia economic and trade cooperation is solid. The two countries will make efforts to buoy declining bilateral trade，” Shen Danyang said at the January news briefing.
The Russians have also realized that as China continues to develop at a rapid pace， so too has their advanced manufacturing prowess. As the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center， Alexander Gabuev， said at a March 7 event in Beijing， Russian arms manufacturers are not worried that the Chinese will copy their makes and models， as their Asian counterparts instead will soon have the expertise and know-how to “invent everything themselves.” Russian manufacturers therefore“see a 10-15 year window in which to sell them everything，” he quipped.
The gun and the purse
The most obvious opportunity for future China-Russia collaboration exists in Central Asia， especially under the framework of the China-led One Belt One Road Initiative（the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road） and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Together they are expected to play a defining role in economic cooperation and integration across Eurasia in the 21st century. In fact， these projects symbolize China’s growing interest in playing a larger role internationally， including helping to finance and invest in infrastructure projects that will better link the continent. However， some Russian experts have cited the lack of detail as a cause of anxiety among Central Asian countries. While they are enthusiastic about the projects’ prospects， they have also expressed their desire for Chinese involvement in the region to be limited to the economic realm. As Gabuev explained， while many Central Asian countries have long-standing relationships with Russia， they are less used to working with the Chinese.
Given the economic potential of Central Asia， one could see it as a place in which Russia and China would naturally compete for regional dominance and the loyalty of local partners. But many Chinese academics and policymakers insist their country is only interested in common development， not empire-building. Hu Hao， Deputy Director General of the China Center for Contemporary World Studies， said， “China will not seek its sphere of influence in Central Asia， which provides some assurances for Russia.”
“Conventional wisdom is that China and Russia will have a conflict there，” Gabuev told Beijing Review. “But if you look at the fundamentals inside there is a lot in common.”He cited the fact that both powers share the goal of keeping current regimes in places， increasing economic development， and ensuring that countries in Central Asia do not become the “new Libya” or the “next Syria，”referring to the breakdown of order in those countries.
“Central Asians also don’t feel comfortable with Chinese immigrating in large numbers， though they are very comfortable with them buying their things，” Gabuev added. “They have a deep-seated fear of being colonized. So for local actors a division of labor is preferred. They are used to Russia’s presence and would not be comfortable with a Chinese military presence in Central Asia.”
But if Russia is to play the role of the “gun”and China the “purse，” the two countries will need to better coordinate in the area of security and increase high-level dialogue and exchange beyond presidential goodwill. Effective delegation of roles also requires trust and understanding， something Chinese and Russian experts alike acknowledge as needing improvement.
Gabuev described the set of factors that drive the two countries apart as psychological factors， as well as different national priorities. He noted that “the elites of the two countries are just not very well connected，” are not oriented toward one another， and therefore lack understanding， he said. Thus Gabuev believes the“mistrust on the Russian side is of long-term Chinese intentions.”
In another analysis， Feng Yujun， Director of the Institute for Russian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations， said， “I think China-Russia relations are entering a new normal. We need to promote understanding of China and Russia as neighbors； we will not repeat the tragedy and the confrontation of the 1960s and 1970s.”
Feng added that the majority of the challenges between the two are of mindsets and ideology. “The mindsets are mostly outdated and won’t serve us well if we hold on to them，”he asserted. “We also have unrealistic expectations of each other， which will only lead to disappointment.”
The question remains then if the two sides can effectively manage a trust gap while paving the way for closer coordination on diplomatic， economic and security issues. For both China and Russia， how they work together in the next five years may define their relationship for the next 50.
For his part， Hu was optimistic in this regard， commenting， “We should not be afraid of these challenges， we should have the courage to solve them.”
Russia’s interests in fighting terrorism in Syria coincided with American interests writ large， and were recognized in a visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on March 24， his third in 10 months. According to Russian state media， the head of the nation’s Foreign Affairs Committee Alexei Pushkov tweeted at the conclusion of the visit： “There’s nothing more powerful in politics than need. Under its influence， forgetting about isolating Russia， the United States has begun to move.”
But Russia’s efforts in Syria also dovetailed with the preferences of its neighbor， China， who too is taking stock of their bilateral relations and evaluating prospects for closer ties. External observers often tie China and Russia together given the close relationship of their current leaders， their communist history， and their regularly shared positions on issues before the United Nations Security Council. Yet their relationship is anything but straightforward， given the complicated set of circumstances in which the two powers evaluate the trade-offs of working closely together.
In short， China-Russia relations do not exist in a vacuum. The intense atmospherics of geopolitics and economic affairs weighs heavily on the tone and tune， creating an endless ebb and flow of “warming” and“cooling，” coordination and collaboration. While China and Russia have clear opportunities to work together， the relationship will continue to be defined by what one can offer the other.
Coordination and trade
A critical development in the China-Russia relationship over the last three years is the “bromance” between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart， Vladimir Putin. It is a relationship defined by respect， exchange， and a strict adherence to non-intervention in the other’s affairs.
Last September， Putin stood in Tiananmen Square in Beijing with other world leaders to watch an elaborate military parade. This included the participation of Russian troops， marking the 70th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War， also called World War II. Just a few months before， Xi had been in Red Square in Moscow with troops from the People’s Liberation Army to mark the anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Putin has already announced his intention to visit China again in 2016. Additionally， the two leaders have conducted extensive energy and economic deals， and closely coordinated their respective positions on topics at the United Nations. They also share the aim of reforming the international governance system. To date， however， the affection between Xi and Putin has yet to translate into a permanent change in the bilateral relationship of the kind some expected.
Today the area in which the two states are most closely linked is by trade， specifically the export of Russian raw materials to China， including： traditional commodities such as oil and metal， hefty military equipment， and increasingly， natural gas and data storage capacity. While China provides a tremendous market for Russia’s exports， Russia also serves as a large market for many “made-in-China” products.
Yet the Sino-Russian trade relationship took a massive hit in 2015， when exports from the former to the latter fell year on year by more than a third， to $32.9 billion， while imports from Russia declined by nearly a fifth to $31.4 billion， a Chinese Customs Department spokesperson， Huang Songping， said in a press conference on January 13.
Despite the significant drop， China continued to be Russia’s largest trading partner in 2015， and trade volume between them could begin increasing on a yearly basis in 2016， a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Commerce said on January 6. “The foundation of ChinaRussia economic and trade cooperation is solid. The two countries will make efforts to buoy declining bilateral trade，” Shen Danyang said at the January news briefing.
The Russians have also realized that as China continues to develop at a rapid pace， so too has their advanced manufacturing prowess. As the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center， Alexander Gabuev， said at a March 7 event in Beijing， Russian arms manufacturers are not worried that the Chinese will copy their makes and models， as their Asian counterparts instead will soon have the expertise and know-how to “invent everything themselves.” Russian manufacturers therefore“see a 10-15 year window in which to sell them everything，” he quipped.
The gun and the purse
The most obvious opportunity for future China-Russia collaboration exists in Central Asia， especially under the framework of the China-led One Belt One Road Initiative（the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road） and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Together they are expected to play a defining role in economic cooperation and integration across Eurasia in the 21st century. In fact， these projects symbolize China’s growing interest in playing a larger role internationally， including helping to finance and invest in infrastructure projects that will better link the continent. However， some Russian experts have cited the lack of detail as a cause of anxiety among Central Asian countries. While they are enthusiastic about the projects’ prospects， they have also expressed their desire for Chinese involvement in the region to be limited to the economic realm. As Gabuev explained， while many Central Asian countries have long-standing relationships with Russia， they are less used to working with the Chinese.
Given the economic potential of Central Asia， one could see it as a place in which Russia and China would naturally compete for regional dominance and the loyalty of local partners. But many Chinese academics and policymakers insist their country is only interested in common development， not empire-building. Hu Hao， Deputy Director General of the China Center for Contemporary World Studies， said， “China will not seek its sphere of influence in Central Asia， which provides some assurances for Russia.”
“Conventional wisdom is that China and Russia will have a conflict there，” Gabuev told Beijing Review. “But if you look at the fundamentals inside there is a lot in common.”He cited the fact that both powers share the goal of keeping current regimes in places， increasing economic development， and ensuring that countries in Central Asia do not become the “new Libya” or the “next Syria，”referring to the breakdown of order in those countries.
“Central Asians also don’t feel comfortable with Chinese immigrating in large numbers， though they are very comfortable with them buying their things，” Gabuev added. “They have a deep-seated fear of being colonized. So for local actors a division of labor is preferred. They are used to Russia’s presence and would not be comfortable with a Chinese military presence in Central Asia.”
But if Russia is to play the role of the “gun”and China the “purse，” the two countries will need to better coordinate in the area of security and increase high-level dialogue and exchange beyond presidential goodwill. Effective delegation of roles also requires trust and understanding， something Chinese and Russian experts alike acknowledge as needing improvement.
Gabuev described the set of factors that drive the two countries apart as psychological factors， as well as different national priorities. He noted that “the elites of the two countries are just not very well connected，” are not oriented toward one another， and therefore lack understanding， he said. Thus Gabuev believes the“mistrust on the Russian side is of long-term Chinese intentions.”
In another analysis， Feng Yujun， Director of the Institute for Russian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations， said， “I think China-Russia relations are entering a new normal. We need to promote understanding of China and Russia as neighbors； we will not repeat the tragedy and the confrontation of the 1960s and 1970s.”
Feng added that the majority of the challenges between the two are of mindsets and ideology. “The mindsets are mostly outdated and won’t serve us well if we hold on to them，”he asserted. “We also have unrealistic expectations of each other， which will only lead to disappointment.”
The question remains then if the two sides can effectively manage a trust gap while paving the way for closer coordination on diplomatic， economic and security issues. For both China and Russia， how they work together in the next five years may define their relationship for the next 50.
For his part， Hu was optimistic in this regard， commenting， “We should not be afraid of these challenges， we should have the courage to solve them.”