个人所得税递延政策一直被视作撬动商业养老保险需求的有力杠杆,其理论基础主要是新古典经济学框架下的贴现效用模型,认为对于理性消费者而言,购买个税递延型养老保险产品,会提升终身效用,消费者具有购买税延型商业养老保险的内在动力。但是,经验事实和行为经济学的研究表明,消费者是有限理性的,存在自我控制认知偏差,时间偏好具有动态不一致性,其行为受到心理因素的影响。在时间偏好动态不一致性的条件下,消费者对税延型商业养老保险的需求意愿和购买量是否会发生变化、发生何种变化,是非常值得深入探讨的问题。本文基于“二元心理系统假说”构建了准双曲线贴现效用模型,认为个体的短视和自我控制能力不足会导致消费者对商业养老保险的需求量明显小于时间一致性条件下的最优需求量,税收优惠政策的效果被削弱。通过个税递延优惠政策撬动商业养老保险市场发展、完善养老保险体系,需要在机制设计、消费者教育等方面协同努力。 The personal income tax deferred policy has been regarded as a powerful lever to leveraging the demand of commercial pension insurance. Its theoretical basis is mainly the discounted utility model under the framework of neoclassical economics. For the rational consumer, purchasing a tax deferred pension Insurance products, will enhance lifelong utility, consumers have the power to buy tax extended commercial pension insurance. However, the empirical facts and behavioral economics studies show that consumers are bounded rationally, there is self-control cognitive bias, temporal preferences have dynamic inconsistencies, and their behavior is influenced by psychological factors. Under the condition of dynamic inconsistency of time preference, whether consumers’ desire for the tax-extended commercial pension insurance will change and whether the purchase amount will change or not will be worthy of further discussion. This paper builds a hypothetical hyperbolic discount utility model based on “Binary Psychological System Hypothesis ”, and finds that the lack of short-sightedness and self-control of individuals will lead consumers’ demand for commercial endowment insurance to be significantly less than that under time-consistent Demand, tax incentives have been weakened. Through tax deferred preferential policies leveraging the development of the commercial pension insurance market and improving the pension insurance system, we need to make concerted efforts in mechanism design and consumer education.