论文部分内容阅读
本文考察了针对证券分析师的第一次执法事件对分析师作为公司外部治理监督者作用的影响。我们发现,相比于2006年《证券法》修订案实施之前,在针对分析师的处罚事件之后,分析师跟踪显著抑制了上市公司的盈余管理程度,考虑内生性问题后得到的实证结果进一步支持了上述发现。我们还进一步发现,执法对明星分析师的影响更显著,且机构投资者对明星分析师发挥外部治理监督作用具有显著影响。因此,本文认为,证券执法比立法更为重要。
This article examines the impact of the first law enforcement incidents on securities analysts on the role of analysts as external governance overseers. We find that the analyst tracking significantly inhibits the earnings management of listed companies and further supports the empirical results obtained after considering endogenous issues, compared with the implementation of the Securities Law of 2006 in the wake of the penalties against analysts The above findings. We further find that law enforcement has a more significant impact on Star analysts and that institutional investors have a significant impact on the role of star analysts in external governance oversight. Therefore, this paper argues that law enforcement of securities is more important than legislation.