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基于具有直角双曲需求函数的寡头垄断竞争行业,研究了企业横向兼并是否有利可图问题.证明了在直角双曲需求函数以及企业兼并成垄断被排除的情况下,若兼并的企业在其内部实施两阶段错开的斯塔克伯格竞争,并且兼并企业与未参与兼并的企业之间进行古诺竞争,则一次先置兼并的行为会使未参与兼并的企业受损,尽管成为兼并企业领头部门虽然有利可图,但是对于兼并后的整个企业则显得无利可图,并且这种兼并将不会引发进行作为局外人企业的系列兼并行为.所得结论与在线性需求函数条件下的结论相反.
Based on the oligopoly competition industry with right-angle hyperbolic demand function, this paper studies whether the horizontal merger of enterprises is profitable or not. It is proved that if the quadratic hyperbolic demand function and the monopoly of merger of enterprises are excluded, Implementing Starkberger’s two-stage staggered competition and the Cournot competition between the merger and non-participating firms, a merger-by-merger will result in the loss of firms not participating in the merger despite being a leader in mergers and acquisitions The department, though profitable, appears unprofitable to the entire post-merger enterprise and the merger will not trigger a series of mergers as an outsider, the conclusion of which contradicts the conclusion of the linear demand function.