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本文以2006-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,以独立董事责任保险的监督效力为研究对象,采用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)、Heckman两步法、迭代式三阶段最小二乘法(3SLS)等方法,考察了独立董事责任保险与上市公司违规、公司业绩及大股东“掏空”行为间的关系。稳健的实证结果表明,独立董事责任保险的引入可以有效抑制国有上市公司违规及大股东“掏空”行为的发生,但对公司业绩存在消极影响。本文的研究对独立董事责任保险的监督效力进行了系统考察,为我国上市公司治理提供了经验证据。
Taking the A-share listed companies in our country for the period of 2006-2015 as a sample and the supervision effect of the independent directors liability insurance as the research object, this paper uses propensity score matching (PSM), Heckman two-step, iterative three-stage least squares And other methods to examine the relationship between independent directors liability insurance and listed companies in violation of regulations, company performance and major shareholder “hollowed out ” behavior. Steady empirical results show that the introduction of independent directors liability insurance can effectively curb the state-owned listed companies and large shareholders “hollowed out ” behavior, but the performance of the company there is a negative impact. The research of this paper makes a systematic investigation of the effectiveness of supervision of independent directors liability insurance and provides empirical evidence for the governance of listed companies in our country.