论文部分内容阅读
碳交易政策下,针对制造商低碳产品的高成本破解难题及零售商“搭便车”现象,引入零售商持股制造商减排投资战略,探讨股权合作下低碳供应链运作与协调策略。研究发现,对于清洁型制造商,碳交易价格的增加会使单位产品碳减排量增加,对于污染型制造商,碳交易价格的降低会使单位产品碳减排量增加。进一步发现,存在一定的零售商持股比例,能减少碳排放同时实现制造商和零售商收益的帕累托改进。随后,引入Shapley值法分配供应链利润,消除了持股前零售商“搭便车”现象及持股后制造商对供应链利润的分配优势,实现了增量利润在供应链成员间均等分配及供应链协调。最后,通过数值分析对结论进行验证并探讨了碳交易价格与持股比例对碳减排量和供应链成员利润的影响。
Under the carbon trading policy, aiming at the high-cost crack problem of low-carbon products and the “free-riding” phenomenon of retailers, this paper introduces the investment strategy of retailers’ shareholding emission reduction and discusses the operation and coordination of low carbon supply chain under the equity cooperation Strategy. The study found that for cleaner manufacturers, the increase of carbon trading price will increase the carbon emission per unit of product, and for the pollution-type manufacturers, the reduction of the carbon trading price will increase the carbon emission per unit of product. It is further found that there is a certain Pareto improvement in retailer shareholding ratio that can reduce carbon emissions while achieving the benefits of both manufacturers and retailers. Subsequently, the introduction of Shapley value distribution of supply chain profits, eliminating the pre-holding retailers “free-riding ” phenomenon and the shareholding of manufacturers after the distribution of profit margins in the supply chain to achieve incremental profits in the supply chain members are equal Distribution and Supply Chain Coordination. Finally, the conclusion is verified by numerical analysis and the impact of carbon trading price and shareholding ratio on carbon emission reductions and supply chain members’ profit is explored.