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在《正义论》第三编中,罗尔斯通过关联“善”和“正当”这两个概念阐释了其道德价值概念,并由此将“卓越”这一道德理念纳入其义务论的伦理评价体系,这使他能够比较容易地处理“分外的行为”这样的道德问题。但是,另一方面,这一对卓越的追求以及与此相关的对个体内在价值的区分和评判却可能与作为罗尔斯正义理论基础的平等观相抵牾。为了避免冲突,罗尔斯通过区分政治与道德,以及道德的正当与就其自身而言并无道德意义的价值(善)概念等策略,寻求一种可以在坚持个体平等的权利之同时容纳价值和道德价值的区分以及对卓越的追求的可能性。本文在重构这些经常隐蔽于其文本中的策略之同时也揭示了它们的局限性,因为与其他价值(善)不同,道德价值既是一种价值(善),又是已经受到正当制约因而是道德的价值,所以,我们不可能在权利问题上如同悬搁其他价值差别一样不考虑道德价值的人际差异。鉴于这一困难,本文尝试借助于罗尔斯所阐释的两种道德情操,即正义感和人类之间的相继关系来显明罗尔斯所言的两种道德观,即“分外的道德”与“互惠和平等的道德”融合于一个整全的道德概念之中的可能性。如果我们将尊严视为一个基于人类之爱的理念,而不只是罗尔斯所言的基于道德能力最低值的政治与法律权利,那么,平等的自由与卓越追求之间就不仅互不抵牾,而且可能相辅相成,因为卓越最终是在平等的自由中所追求的完善和自我完善,而平等的权利则构成了个体自由地同时也是在与他人的关系中追求卓越的必不可少的条件。
In the third installment of Justice, Rawls elaborates the concept of moral value by linking the two concepts of “good” and “right”, and from this, he puts the notion of “excellence” Incorporating the ethical evaluation system of his obligation doctrine enabled him to deal more easily with ethical issues such as “extraordinary behavior”. On the other hand, however, this distinction between the pursuit of excellence and the related intrinsic value of the individual may be counterbalanced by the notion of equality that underlies Rawls’s theory of justice. In order to avoid conflicts, Rawls tries to find a solution that can preserve the rights of individual equality by distinguishing between politics and morality, moral justification and the concept of value (goodness) that is not moral in itself. And the distinction between moral values and the possibility of pursuing excellence. This article also reveals their limitations in reconstructing these tactics, often hidden in their texts, because, unlike other values (goodness), moral values are both a value (goodness) and have been properly conditioned and thus Moral value, therefore, it is impossible for us to disregard the interpersonal differences of moral values on the issue of rights just like suspending other value differences. In view of this difficulty, this article tries to make clear to the two moral concepts Rawls said by means of the two moral sentiments explained by Rawls, the sense of justice and the successive relationship between human beings. “And ” reciprocity and equal morality "the possibility of integration into a complete concept of morality. If we regard dignity as a concept based on the love of mankind, not just Rawls’s political and legal rights based on the lowest moral capacity, then not only do we not resist each other between equal freedom and excellence, And may complement each other, for excellence is ultimately the perfection and self-perfection pursued in equal freedom, and equal rights constitute an indispensable condition for individuals to pursue their excellence freely and simultaneously in their relations with others.