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以演化博弈模型为主要理论工具,在对知识创造行为与组织惯例关系予以描述的基础上,构建知识创造行为与组织惯例的演化博弈模型。通过求解复制动态方程,分析不同条件下知识创造行为与组织惯例分别达到演化稳定均衡的策略。研究结果表明:知识创造行为与组织惯例的匹配属于动态、重复博弈过程,参与博弈的预期收益、激励成本、转换成本直接决定演化稳定策略且影响个体对知识创造行为与组织惯例的选择,知识创造行为则倾向以承袭为主的保守策略。演化博弈方法的引入为知识创造行为和组织惯例的研究开辟了全新视角,也为相关领域的进一步探索提供有利的理论支持。
Evolutionary game model as the main theoretical tool, based on the description of the relationship between knowledge creation behavior and organizational practice, to build an evolutionary game model of knowledge creation behavior and organizational practice. By solving the replication dynamic equation, we analyze the strategy that the knowledge creation behavior and the organizational routines respectively reach the stable evolution equilibrium under different conditions. The results show that the matching between knowledge creation behavior and organizational practice belongs to the dynamic and repeated game process, the expected benefits of participating in the game, the incentive cost and the conversion cost directly determine the evolutionary stability strategy and influence the individual’s choice of knowledge creation behavior and organizational routines, knowledge creation Behaviors tend to be based on inherited conservative strategies. The introduction of evolutionary game theory opens up a new perspective for the study of knowledge creation and organizational practice, and also provides favorable theoretical support for further exploration in related fields.