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本文研究了一个产出不确定的供应商与一个社会计划者组成的两级流感疫苗供应链决策问题,其中社会计划者在分散无契约情形时仅知道随机产量的部分信息,而在集中控制情形时知道随机产量的全部信息。供应商在初始供货时由于生产的不确定性而出现短缺,此时供应商将采用紧急生产方式来弥补短缺量,其中紧急生产成本依赖随机产量。文章在分析了分散无契约与集中控制情形后提出用短缺惩罚与成本分享契约来完美协调流感疫苗供应链。最后给出数值算例,并对主要参数进行灵敏度分析。
This paper studies a two-level influenza vaccine supply chain decision making problem between an output-uncertain supplier and a social planner, in which social planners know only part of the information about random production when the non-contractual situation is decentralized. In the case of centralized control Know all the information about random production. In the initial supply of suppliers because of production uncertainties and shortages, suppliers will use emergency mode of production to cover shortages, emergency production costs which rely on random production. After analyzing the situation of decentralized non-contract and centralized control, the article proposes that the contract of shortage punishment and cost sharing can be used to perfect coordination of influenza vaccine supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters is carried out.