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本文利用中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了两职分离或两职合一的权力配置对企业业绩与高管个人薪酬的影响。研究发现,两职分离或两职合一的权力配置与企业业绩并不存在显著的相关性;相反,对高管个人的效用产生了显著影响。具体表现在两职分离相比于两职合一,会显著降低高管的薪酬水平,同时也会降低其薪酬业绩敏感性,主要表现在业绩上升时的薪酬业绩敏感性。研究发现,两职合一权力配置的获得与董事长个人社会资本显著相关,拥有政治资本、政治资本级别越高以及政治资本在管理者团队中越稀缺的高管,更容易获得两职合一的权力配置。本文研究的结论表明,作为公司治理的重要制度安排,两职分离或两职合一在企业层面实现了帕累托最优,是企业基于自身组织特征的理性选择;而对于高管个人而言,其基于自身效用最大化的考虑,可能存在两职合一的选择偏好。但是,这种选择偏好的实现依赖自身的社会资本。本文的研究从企业层面和高管个人层面探讨了两职分离或两职合一的经济后果,打开了权力配置的黑箱,同时,为人力资源理论、管理者权力理论在管理者薪酬契约中的应用提供了经验证据。
This paper uses the Chinese A-share listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen as a sample to study the influence of the separation of the two positions or the combination of two positions on the corporate performance and executive compensation. The study found that there is no significant correlation between the separation of the two positions or the combination of the two positions and the performance of the enterprise. On the contrary, the utility of individual executives has a significant impact. Specific performance in the separation of two posts compared to the two positions in one, will significantly reduce the executive pay levels, but also reduce the sensitivity of their pay performance, mainly in the performance of the pay rise performance sensitivity. The study found that the acquisition of two-in-one power allocation is significantly related to the personal social capital of the chairman of the board. Political executives who possess political capital, political capital, and the scarce political capital in the management team are more likely to get one-on-one Power allocation. The conclusion of this study shows that, as an important institutional arrangement of corporate governance, the separation of two positions or the combination of two positions at the enterprise level has realized the Pareto Optimality, which is the rational choice of the enterprise based on its own organizational characteristics. For the executives, , Which based on their own utility to maximize the consideration, there may be a combination of two positions one of the preferences. However, the realization of this preference depends on its own social capital. This study explores the economic consequences of the separation of two posts or the combination of two posts from the corporate level and from the senior executives’ level and opens up a black box of power allocation. At the same time, for human resource theory and manager power theory in the executive compensation contract Application provides empirical evidence.