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除了信息不对称、规制被俘获以及规制机构承诺能力的不完全性以外,规制过度也会造成规制失败。现代零售商既是网络产业,也是具有双边市场特征的竞争性交易平台,进场费的费率就是供货商接入零售商网络向消费者提供产品时的接入价格。平台之间的竞争会迫使零售商收取费用的水平向拉姆齐最优定价逼近,从而《零售商供应商公平交易管理办法》是在最优价格已然形成时实施的过度规制。所以,其规制失败的表现主要不是未能实现规制目标,而是这一规制本身破坏了通道费自发调节机制,减弱了零售商的规模经济性。
In addition to information asymmetry, regulatory capture, and institutional imperfections, the over-regulation can also result in regulatory failure. Modern retailers are not only the network industry, but also a competitive trading platform with the characteristics of the bilateral markets. The entrance fee rate is the access price when the supplier accesses the retailer network to provide products to the consumers. The competition between platforms will force retailers to charge Ramsay the optimal pricing level so that the “Retailer Supplier Fair Trade Practices” is an over-regulation that takes place when optimal prices are already in place. Therefore, the failure of regulation is not mainly failed to achieve the regulatory goal. Instead, the regulation itself undermines the voluntary adjustment of toll fee and reduces the retailer’s economies of scale.