基于中国上市公司股权激励行权时间限制和行权业绩考核的特殊制度背景,本文考察股权激励公司的盈余管理优序决策问题。研究发现分类转移、应计和真实活动盈余管理的优序因高管所持权益类型的不同存在显著差异。持有处于行权限制期限内的期权和限制性股票的高管最偏好分类转移,其次应计盈余管理,最后选择真实活动盈余管理;而持有可行权期权和非限制性股票的高管最偏好应计盈余管理,其次分类转移,最后选择真实活动盈余管理。实证结果表明,在股权激励情境下,分类转移的主要功能是帮助高管达到股权激励行权考核业绩条件和抬高股价,应计盈余管理则主要用于抬高股价,真实活动盈余管理由于损害公司长期业绩,成为最后的选择。三类盈余管理收益和成本的差异决定了高管对其偏好的优序。 Based on the special institutional background of time limit of exercise of share incentive and the performance appraisal of exercise performance of listed companies in China, this paper investigates the issue of earnings management superior order decision of equity incentive company. The study found that the order of classification transfer, accruals and real activities earnings management is significantly different due to the different types of rights and interests held by executives. Executives with options and restricted stocks that are subject to exercise limits are most likely to shift transfers, followed by accrued earnings management, and ultimately with real activity earnings management; while executives who own exercisable options and unrestricted stocks are the most Preference accrued earnings management, followed by classification transfer, the final choice of real activity earnings management. The empirical results show that in the context of equity incentive, the main function of the classification transfer is to help executives achieve equity incentive exercise performance evaluation conditions and raise stock prices, accrued earnings management is mainly used to raise the stock price, the real activity of earnings management due to damage Long-term performance of the company, as the last option. The differences between the returns and costs of the three types of Earnings Management determine the priorities that senior executives give to their preferences.