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本文针对中央和地方哪级政府提供公共服务更有效率的问题,构建了中央和地方政府提供公共产品服务相对效率的理论模型。研究表明:当公共产品的外部性较小且(或)辖区有充分的异质性时,地方政府提供公共品更有效率;当公共产品的外部性较大且为正时,中央政府提供更有效率;若公共产品的成本和收益在各辖区具有充分的同质性,且公共产品有较强的正外部性时,中央政府帕累托占优;若各辖区中公共产品的只是成本充分接近,而收益差异较大时,中央政府可能达不到帕累托最优。
In this paper, the central and local governments at all levels to provide public services more efficient issues, the establishment of the central and local governments to provide public services, the relative efficiency of the theoretical model. The research shows that when the externalities of public goods are small and (or) the area has sufficient heterogeneity, local governments provide public goods more efficiently. When the externalities of public goods are large and positive, the central government provides more Effective; if the cost and benefits of public goods in all jurisdictions have full homogeneity, and public goods have a strong positive externalities, the central government Pareto dominated; if the only public areas in the cost of the product Close, while the income difference is large, the central government may not reach Pareto optimal.