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本文在资产专用性理论基础上,利用“捆绑上市”公司作为研究样本,考察非控股股东通过关联交易对上市公司进行“掏空”的机会主义行为。研究发现由于捆绑上市过程中产业捆绑赋予上市公司非控股股东专用性资产的控制权以及非控股股东在信息、产业等方面的独有优势,在公司经营中实现控制力的权力反转,可以通过关联交易对上市公司进行利益侵占,且上市公司的资产专用性越强,此类关联交易程度越高。此外,通过进一步观察发现,这种资产专用性及关联交易随着样本公司上市时间的增加而逐步减少,此趋势对于捆绑公司更为明显,表明这种基于资产专用性的机会主义关联交易由于不符合市场整体发展的要求而被逐步淘汰。
Based on the theory of asset specificity, this paper uses the “bundled listing” company as a research sample to examine opportunistic behaviors of non-controlling shareholders ’emptied "of listed companies through related party transactions. The research finds that because of the bundling of industries in the process of bundling and listing, the controlling power of non-controlling shareholders in listed companies and the unique advantages of non-controlling shareholders in information and industry can be reversed Related party transactions for the interests of listed companies encroachment, and the assets of listed companies the stronger the higher the degree of such related party transactions. In addition, through further observation, this asset specificity and related party transactions gradually decrease with the increase of listing time of sample companies. This trend is more obvious to the bundled companies, indicating that this opportunistic affiliate transaction based on asset specificity is not In line with the overall development of the market requirements and be phased out.