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债权人对控股股东的制衡力量在学术界一直鲜有人关注。本文就企业的银行负债对控股股东代理成本的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验,在此基础上进一步检验了产权性质对二者关系的调节作用,以及内部治理机制和法律环境与银行负债的交互作用。利用中国A股房地产上市公司2003—2008年的数据,研究表明,企业的银行负债显著降低了控股股东代理成本;进一步研究发现,产权性质对二者关系具有调节作用,公司内部治理机制、法律环境与银行负债存在交互作用。本文所得出的研究结论既丰富了委托代理、资本结构等相关理论,也对银行与国有企业产权改革,以及企业融资决策具有较强启示意义。
Creditor’s controlling shareholder’s balance of power in the academic community has been little attention. This paper makes a theoretical analysis and empirical test on the influence of corporate bank liabilities on the controlling shareholder’s agency costs. Based on this, it further tests the regulatory role of the property rights on the relationship between the two and the interaction between the internal governance mechanism and the legal environment and bank liabilities effect. Using the data of Chinese A-share real estate listed companies from 2003 to 2008, the research shows that the bank liabilities of the enterprises significantly reduce the controlling shareholder’s agency costs. Further research finds that the nature of the property rights has a regulatory effect on the relationship between the two. The internal governance mechanism and the legal environment Interaction with bank debt. The conclusions drawn in this paper not only enriches the theory of principal-agent and capital structure, but also has strong implications for the reform of property rights of banks and state-owned enterprises as well as corporate financing decisions.