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目前,我国普遍存在同一流域梯级水电站投资主体不统一的现象,当代表各自投资主体利益的梯级水电站单独参加竞争性电力交易时,会导致梯级水电资源配置的低效性。针对这一问题,提出一种有利于实现市场环境下梯级水电资源有效配置的代理机制。当市场规则允许时,属于不同投资主体的梯级水电站将自发地采用代理机制参与市场竞争。首先,运用机制设计理论对梯级水电站代理机制进行了初步设计;其次,建立基于供给函数的梯级水电代理竞价模型,并应用逐次逼近法和粒子群算法求解市场均衡状态;最后,通过算例对梯级水电站代理商参与日前市场的均衡状态进行模拟。所提出的模型和算法在梯级水电参与市场竞争的研究方面具有参考价值。
At present, there is a common phenomenon that the investors in the cascade hydropower stations in the same basin are not unified. When the cascaded hydropower stations, which represent the interests of their respective investors, separately participate in competitive power transactions, inefficient allocation of cascade hydropower resources will result. In response to this problem, we propose an agency mechanism that is conducive to the effective allocation of cascade hydropower resources in a market environment. When market rules permit, cascade hydropower plants belonging to different investment entities will spontaneously adopt an agency mechanism to participate in market competition. First, the mechanism design theory is used to design the agent mechanism of cascade hydropower stations. Secondly, the bidding model of cascade hydropower agents based on the supply function is established. The successive approximation method and particle swarm optimization algorithm are used to solve the market equilibrium. Finally, Hydropower station agents to participate in the equilibrium state of the market before the simulation. The proposed models and algorithms have reference value in the research of cascade hydropower participation in market competition.