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本文以美国著名法学、古典学和伦理学教席努斯鲍姆的《善的脆弱性》这部伦理学著作为出发点,将“善”作为法之上和法无法完全涵括之伦理价值内容,通过对于人可否欲求善、善之脆弱边界等伦理问题之讨论——以显现其会否为人之愿力与人性所能达——而或许儒家资源于此可构成一个对观式之探讨范式。而另一方面,诗或悲剧作为神学(而非哲学包括柏拉图和亚里士多德哲学理论所能完全涵括之的),诗学作为法学之对观与另一种形而上学理论资源,其在今天之法价值批判和现代性的善讨论中之意义与坐标是什么?本文尝试提出一个诗学之于法学的批判理论。
Based on the ethics of Nussbaum’s “Good Vulnerability”, a famous American legal, classical and ethical teaching post, this article takes “good ” as the law and the ethics which can not be completely covered by law The content of value, through discussion of ethical issues such as the desires for goodness and the delicate boundaries of goodness, in order to show whether it will be aspirational and human as human beings, or perhaps Confucian resources may constitute a discussion of attitudes Paradigm. On the other hand, poetry or tragedy as theology (as opposed to philosophy, which can be completely covered by the philosophical theory of Plato and Aristotle), poetics as the concept of law and the metaphysical resources of another metaphysics What are the meanings and the co-ordinates of today’s discussion of the value of law and of the goodness of modernity? This article attempts to propose a critical theory of poetics from jurisprudence.