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制度分析学派通过不同制度的交易费用状况的比较,对各种制度的特征进行了较充分的分析。但是,对于公共物品的供给制度来说,由于公共物品的公共性价值特征导致的交易费用的复杂性,不能在单一维度的视角下笼统地仅考虑费用的数量大小,由此来评判制度安排和公共决策的好坏。因为除了信息不对称因素所产生的交易费用以外,有相当一部分被视为诱发交易费用的行为实际上是在体现和保证物品的公共性,这些费用表现为公共协商的成本和对损失方补偿的费用。试图从多种维度对公共物品供给中的交易费用进行分析,不仅对信息不对称如何产生交易费用进行了描述,还对公共协商和对损失方补偿产生的费用所表现出的公共性价值进行了解析;并借用了公共选择学派的广义宪政经济学理论,探讨了交易费用的最优解;最后倡导建立具有公共性特征的公共物品供给的交易费用观。
Institutional analysis through different systems of transaction costs comparison of the characteristics of the various systems were more fully analyzed. However, for the supply of public goods, due to the complexity of the transaction costs caused by the public value of public goods, we can not generally consider only the amount of the cost in a single dimension, thus to judge the institutional arrangements and The quality of public decision-making. Because in addition to transaction costs arising from asymmetric information, a considerable portion of transactions deemed to be transaction-induced costs actually reflect and guarantee the publicity of the items, which represent the cost of public consultation and compensation to the loser cost. Attempts to analyze the transaction costs in the supply of public goods from a variety of dimensions not only describes how transaction costs are incurred as a result of information asymmetry but also makes public value represented by public consultation and fees incurred in compensation for the loser Analyzes and borrows the generalist constitutional economics theory of the public choice school to discuss the optimal solution of the transaction cost. Finally, it advocates the establishment of the view of the transaction cost of the public goods supply with the public characteristics.