In a symmetrical static game model, this paper is mainly concerned with the research and development (R&D) strategy of the High Technology (HT) industry and the society's optimal R&D level given the investment revenue. We obtain different investment decision with different amount of firms engaging in the R&D and each firm's expected profit respectively. When the risk (the probability each firm succeed) is not random, it's socially desirable to have more firm engaging in R&D if and only if the relationship among the invest cost, the probability and the prize satisfies some condition, that is, Eπ s(n)≥Eπ s(n-1)I≤α(1-α) n-1 V . When the R&D cost I is certain, more prizes or higher probability will make more firms engage in the R&D and higher prize makes it's socially desirable to have more firm invest in R&D. In a symmetrical static game model, this paper is mainly concerned with the research and development (R & D) strategy of the High Technology (HT) industry and the society's optimal R & D level given the investment revenue. We obtained different investment decision with different amount of firms engaging in the R & D and each firm's expected profit respectively respectively. When the risk (the probability each firm succeed) is not random, it's socially desirable to have more firm engaging in R & D if and only if the relationship among the invest cost, the probability and the Primary Equalities, that is, Eπs (n) ≥Eπ s (n-1) I≤α (1 -α) n-1V. When the R & D cost I is certain, more prizes or higher probability will make more firms engage in the R & D and higher prize makes it's socially desirable to have more firm invest in R & D.