在证券法律体系已经相对比较完备的情况下,执行问题成了学者们关注的焦点。现实中的证券法律执行,经常是执法者在不同时期、针对具体情形有选择性地采取不同的执行强度,即选择性执行。基于IPO核准的经验研究发现,市场低迷阶段的IPO核准速度较慢,这对来自所在辖区政治地位较高地区的公司更为明显;进一步引入发行市盈率后研究发现,市场低迷、所在辖区政治地位较低、发行核准越慢的公司,其发行市盈率越低,但所在辖区政治地位较高地区的公司发行市盈率没有显著更低,在市场繁荣时期却表现出相反的结果。研究结论为理解转型经济中政府管制选择性执行的状况、路径和经济后果提供了一个有益的视角。 In the securities law system has been relatively complete circumstances, the implementation of the issue has become the focus of scholars. In practice, the enforcement of securities laws is often carried out by enforcers at different times and selectively for different situations, ie selective execution. The empirical study based on IPO approval finds that the IPOs approved in the market downturn are slower, which is more obvious to the companies from the regions with higher political status in their respective jurisdictions. After further introducing the issue price-earnings ratio, the study finds that the market downturn and the political status of the region in which they are located are relatively The lower the issuance-issuing rate, the slower the issuance-price-earnings ratio. However, the company’s P / E ratio in the region with higher political status is not significantly lower, but shows opposite results during the market boom. The conclusions of the study provide a useful perspective for understanding the status, path and economic consequences of the selective implementation of government regulation in transitional economy.