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根据制度设计的不同特点,农村“拆村并居”改革主要可分为强制与参与两种类型。本文以不同约束条件下地方政府经济发展目标最大化模型,分别对上述两种类型进行模拟,发现:在存在参与的“拆村并居”改革中,农户将会选择最优参与意愿,而地方政府的目标函数也得以约束条件下的帕累托最优。而在强制改革性改革路径下,地方政府的目标函数无法实现最大化。对于四川成都和山东诸城改革实践的分析也表明,改革中参与性的路径将产生更为有效和公正的结果。
According to the different characteristics of the system design, rural areas can be divided into two types: compulsory and participation. Based on the maximization model of local government’s economic development under different constraints, this paper simulates the above two types respectively and finds that in the reform of “demolishing the village and living together”, the farmers will choose the optimal willingness to participate, However, the objective function of local government is also optimal under Pareto constraints. However, in the path of forcible reform, the objective function of local government can not be maximized. An analysis of the reform practices in Chengdu, Sichuan and Zhucheng in Shandong also shows that the path of participation in the reform will produce more effective and fair results.