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现代企业的一个重要特征是所有权与管理权的分离,委托代理问题和道德风险是其固有缺陷,在国有企业中则更为复杂。一般来说,由于面临不同的公司治理结构和道德风险问题,非国有企业相较于同类的国有企业能获得更高的绩效。因此,每当市场失灵时,产权的国有属性通常会被认为应负主要责任而备受指责。本文通过检验国有企业中大股东产权的变动及其对绩效的影响,指明了国有产权改革的路径及其边界。研究结果表明,增加控股股东持股比例会显著降低企业的绩效,而在一定幅度内减少控股股东持股比例会显著提高企业的绩效。因此,国有企业应当进一步完善产权制度改革,以中国式的渐近式改革逐步降低国有控股股东的产权,发展混合所有制经济,优化企业产权结构。
An important feature of modern enterprises is the separation of ownership and management rights, the principal-agent problem and moral hazard, which are inherent defects and are more complicated in state-owned enterprises. In general, non-state-owned enterprises can achieve higher performance than their state-owned counterparts because of different corporate governance structures and ethical risks. Therefore, whenever a market fails, the state property of the property is often blamed for its primary responsibility. By examining the changes of the property rights of the majority shareholder in state-owned enterprises and their influence on the performance, this paper points out the path and boundary of the reform of state-owned property rights. The results show that increasing the proportion of controlling shareholders will significantly reduce the performance of enterprises, while reducing the proportion of controlling shareholders to a certain extent will significantly improve the performance of enterprises. Therefore, state-owned enterprises should further improve the reform of property rights system, gradually reduce the property rights of state-controlled shareholders with the gradual reform of Chinese style, develop the mixed-ownership economy and optimize the structure of property rights of enterprises.