本文选取2012—2014年深交所A股主板上市的1 080家上市公司为研究样本,分析管理层的权力对信息披露质量的影响。研究发现:提高管理层的所有权权力能够相应地提高上市公司的信息披露质量;减少管理层的结构性权力则能增加上市公司的信息披露质量;增加管理层的声望权力反而能提高上市公司披露的信息质量;增加管理层的专家权力则能相应地提高上市公司披露的信息质量。基于实证结果,建议监管层根据中国企业的实际特点来优化上市公司管理层的权力,加强和完善上市公司的信息披露制度,完善上市公司的内部治理机制,使上市公司的信息披露质量得到进一步的提高。 This article selects 1 080 listed companies listed on A-share of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2014 as the research sample to analyze the impact of management power on the quality of information disclosure. The study found that: raising the ownership of management can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies accordingly; reducing the structural power of management can increase the quality of information disclosure of listed companies; increasing the prestige of management can improve the disclosure of listed companies The quality of information; the increase of management’s expert power can improve the quality of information disclosed by listed companies accordingly. Based on the empirical results, it is suggested that the regulators optimize the power of management of listed companies according to the actual characteristics of Chinese enterprises, strengthen and perfect the information disclosure system of listed companies, improve the internal governance mechanism of listed companies and make the quality of information disclosure of listed companies further improve.