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为什么终究有一个宇宙,而不是什么都没有这个表述提出的是一个有名无实的问题,它是莱布尼兹于1697与1714年提出的两个相续提问的融合。他这样做是为了给他的有神论解释奠定基础。本文是2004年的长篇(54页)论文《有神论宇宙学的贫困》的续篇,那篇论文发表在《英国科学哲学杂志》第55卷的561至614页上。本文所做的工作是:(1)莱布尼兹要求对那个问题做出解释,而本文所做的批判性考察则得出了一个对之非常不利的结论;(2)本文的论证表明:莱布尼兹将那个疑问句的本体论难题作为他以及R.斯温本(Richard Swinburne)的创世有神论回答的跳板,这种做法是完全失败的。在(1)中的论证是,莱布尼兹的解释要求是一个构思拙劣的启动器,它提出了一个伪问题(pseudoissue)。因此,他以及斯温本支持神圣创世的论据完全是失败的。本文附带的结论是:哲学事业根本不必为莱布尼兹的本体论疑问所累,因为它只是一个幻影。
Why there is a Universe at the end of the universe, not nothing. What this statement presents is a question of what is not. It is a fusion of two successive questions raised by Leibniz in 1697 and 1714. He did so in order to lay the foundation for his theistic interpretation. This article is a continuation of the long, 54-page paper, The Poverty of Theatonic Cosmology, of 2004, which was published in volumes 561-614 of Volume 55 of British Journal of Scientific Philosophy. The work done in this paper is: (1) Leibniz asked for an explanation of the problem, and the critical investigation made in this article came to a very unfavorable conclusion; (2) The argument of this paper shows that: Leibniz failed the ontological problem of the interrogative sentence as a springboard for him and the creationistic theism of R. Swinburne, a complete failure. The argument in (1) is that Leibniz’s explanation requires a poorly constructed starter, which raises a pseudoissue. Therefore, his arguments, as well as Swin Benn’s support for the divine creation, are completely defeated. The conclusion to this article is that the philosophical cause need not be burdened with Leibniz’s ontological doubt at all because it is only an illusion.