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霍布斯认为动机的来源是欲望和嫌恶,而意志仅仅是一个机械运动。道德动机源于自利及其所伴随的对被伤害的恐惧。巴特勒将动机分为四种:自爱、仁爱、混合动机和良心。良心或反思原则引导思考行动的动机和后果,并做出赞许或不赞许的评判,它是高于其他动机的权威。霍布斯与巴特勒的思想都具备英国经验论的色彩,留下一些问题促使后来的哲学家探讨。休谟继承了霍布斯的道德来源于感觉的观点,以及巴特勒道德情感的思想,将社会同情看做首要的道德情感。康德在解决自由意志与决定论难题时,否认道德标准与道德动机来源于经验,提出自由意志在于自由地制定与自由地服从道德法则。舍勒则进一步地综合了理性与情感,发掘了既非理性也非感性的先天性道德情感体验。
Hobbes believes that the source of motivation is desires and dislikes, and the will is just a mechanical movement. Moral motivation stems from self-interest and its accompanying fear of being hurt. Butler divided the motives into four types: self-love, love, mixed motives and conscience. The principles of conscience or reflection guide the motivation and consequences of thinking actions and make judgments of praise or disapproval, which are more authoritative than any other motivation. Both Hobbes and Butler’s thoughts have the qualities of British empiricism, leaving behind some questions for later philosophers to explore. Hume inherited Hobbes’s moral feeling from the point of view, as well as Butler’s moral and emotional thought, the social sympathy as the primary moral emotion. In solving the problems of free will and determinism, Kant denied that moral standards and moral motivation originated from experience, and proposed that the free will lies in freely formulating and freely submitting to moral rules. Scheler further integrated the rational and emotional, excavated the innate moral and emotional experience that is neither rational nor sensual.