China’s recent activities on its ocean frontier have given rise to a fear that it’s seeking to expand its power at the expense of others now that it has a more powerful navy. The essence of this idea is that China’s activities are expansionist and more aggressive compared with 20 or 30 years ago because it has a new urge for more territory or because it wants to throw its newfound weight around in maritime areas to rewrite regional order.
　　Another interpretation is possible， more in conformity with the facts， and less sinister. China’s ocean frontier has， for the most part， never been settled in the four centuries since the idea of maritime borders under international law was first articulated in 1609. China’s primary motivation， then， is to defend what it sees as its island territories which neighboring countries have attempted to usurp.
　　Regional order， as defined by the balance of economic and military power between Japan and China and between the mainland and Taiwan， has already been rewritten by China’s peaceful rise and any additional gains accruing from the control of its claimed small island territories in the South China Sea would be marginal. For China， the main game on its maritime frontier is successful reunification of the mainland and Taiwan， which sits at the northern end of the South China Sea. Though China has come to describe the dispute in the Nansha Islands as a “core interest” because it involves sovereign territory， that is hardly new and is only a statement of the obvious. The more important characterization driving Chinese policy for decades has remained， as one Chinese Government adviser observed in 1996， that the dispute is “small in scale and local in nature.”
　　Beginning in the mid-1800s， colonial powers such as the United Kingdom， France， Japan and the United States became involved in carving out spheres of influence or de facto sovereignty （“concessions” of some kind） over enclaves of Chinese land territory in such a way that the country， weak in naval power， didn’t place any priority on asserting or protecting a maritime frontier.
　　It wasn’t until an 1887 treaty with France delim- iting a sea border with the French protectorate of Tonkin that China began to take any action to demarcate and defend an ocean frontier. This was followed in 1895 by China being forced to surrender the island of Taiwan and associated small islands to Japan as a result of a brief war between the two countries， confirming the weakness of China on its maritime frontier at that time. And it was only with the defeat of Japan in 1945 that China again was in a position to demarcate and defend its maritime frontier， including around Taiwan， free from foreign military threat， invasion or occupation. 　　The opportunity was short-lived because the country again fell into civil war， which resulted in an enduring stalemate about the country’s ocean frontier. In 1949， the Communist victory was incomplete. The Kuomintang regime was able to establish itself on Taiwan.
　　Beginning with Canada in 1970， major Western powers still recognizing the Taiwan authorities began to shift their diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. This has the inevitable effect under international law of preserving to a unitary China （led by the only recognized government） all territorial rights of the Republic of China prior to 1949. Of special significance， these include its claim to the Nansha Islands， manifested in 1946 through physical occupation of the island of Taiping. The mainland and Taiwan maintain nearly identical territorial claims in the South China Sea.
　　Thus， the current maritime territorial disputes predate the rise of China’s power and increase in its naval capability. Any assumption that China has somehow expanded its maritime claims because it now feels more powerful is not borne out by the facts. One of many things that have changed about the disputes is China’s willingness to act robustly， as most states would， to defend pre-existing sovereignty claims that have been in place for at least 67 years.