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网络空间威慑不同于常规威慑与核威慑,二者基于不同的原则而运转。在网络空间中,由于网络攻击者的匿名性、网络归因溯源技术的受限性以及网络空间本身的互联互通性,本来身处局外的“第三方”却常常深深卷入其中。就此,作者在情景假设的基础上提出一个严肃的理论问题:如果网络空间威慑第三方卷入难以避免,那么威慑方应当如何推进第三方责任?依据利益相关者理论,作者首先定义并厘清了“第三方”在网络空间威慑中的“局外合作者”身份和作用,提出网络空间威慑效力的发挥严重依赖于威慑方与第三方的紧密合作;若要诱导并约束第三方持续参与合作威慑进程,则必须要解决利益驱动和违约欺骗两个核心问题,同时更要明晰和推进第三方在网络空间威慑中的地位和责任范畴。简言之,网络空间威慑,第三方深深卷入其中;在发挥威慑效力的过程中,“合作安全”是其基本运行原则;威慑效力严重依赖于威慑方与第三方的紧密合作。
Cyberspace deterrence is different from conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence, both based on different principles. Due to the anonymity of cyberattacks, the limitation of network attribution due to traceability and the interoperability of cyberspace, cyberpacers are often deeply involved in cyberspace . In this connection, the author puts forward a serious theoretical question based on the scenario hypothesis: If cyberspace deterrence of third-party involvement is unavoidable, how should the deterrent party promote the third-party responsibility? According to the stakeholder theory, the author first defines and clarifies “Third party” identity and role of “outside partner” in deterrence of cyberspace, put forward that cyberspace deterrence effectiveness exerts a serious reliance on deterrent parties to cooperate closely with third parties; to induce and constrain third parties to continue To participate in the cooperative deterrence process, we must solve the two core issues of interest-driven and default fraud, and at the same time we must clarify and promote the third party’s position and responsibility in cyber-space deterrence. In short, cyberspace deterrence is deeply involved in by third parties. In the process of deterring effectiveness, “cooperative security” is its basic operating principle; deterrent effectiveness depends heavily on deterrence and close cooperation with third parties.