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本文从高管更换视角考察控股股东侵占上市公司利益的行为是否以及如何影响其高管激励效率。我们检验发现:(1)控股股东利益侵占会降低公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性。(2)当信息不对称程度较高时,公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性受控股股东利益侵占的负向影响更大。(3)当市场化程度较高时,控股股东利益侵占对公司高管更换效率的损害更小。这些实证结果表明,控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突会损害高管激励效率,并且在信息不对称程度较高时更为严重,但市场化程度的提高可以在一定程度上抑制这种负面影响。
This article examines whether and how the controlling shareholders encroach on the interests of listed companies from the perspective of executive change and how they affect the incentive efficiency of their executives. Our test found that: (1) the controlling shareholder’s interests will reduce the sensitivity of corporate executives to replace the performance. (2) When the degree of asymmetric information is high, the sensitivity of company executives to change performance is more negatively affected by the interests of controlling shareholders. (3) When the degree of marketization is high, the control shareholder’s interests encroach on the company’s executives to replace the less damage. These empirical results show that the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders will undermine the incentive efficiency of senior executives and become more serious when the degree of information asymmetry is higher. However, the increase of the degree of marketization can restrain this negative effect to a certain extent influences.