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创业板上市公司自2002年设立独立董事制度以来,因其必要性和重要性一直受到国内外众多学者和专家的关注。本文旨在研究创业板上市公司中,独立董事监督力对盈余稳健性的影响。本文在概括阐述其研究背景和意义的基础上,归纳总结了国内外文献中关于独立董事制度和盈余管理质量的研究;在充分的理论研究的基础上,本文发现中国当下创业板上市公司中独立董事占比较低,存在独立董事结构不完善、未能和监事会有效平衡等问题,最后本文也就此提出了一些建设性的意见。总的来说,目前中国的独立董事制度对上市公司的盈余管理还是有一定制约作用的,但距其设立初衷还可谓任重而道远。
Since the establishment of an independent director system in 2002, the GEM has been receiving the attention of many scholars and experts both at home and abroad for its necessity and importance. The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of the supervision power of independent directors on the earnings robustness in GEM companies. Based on the summary of the research background and significance of this article, this paper summarizes the domestic and foreign literature on the independent director system and the quality of earnings management research. On the basis of sufficient theoretical research, this paper finds that the current independence of China’s GEM listed companies The proportion of directors is low, the structure of independent directors is not perfect, and the effective balance between the board of supervisors and other issues is not resolved. Finally, this article also put forward some constructive suggestions in this regard. In summary, the current system of independent directors in China still has some restraint on the earnings management of listed companies, but it still lays a long way to go before its establishment.