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本文在动态投资理论和最优合约的基础上,放松了代理人为理性人的假设,认为代理人存在过度自信,会高估自己的能力和产出。而投资者是理性的,能根据代理人的过度自信程度制定最优合约,以最低的激励成本促使代理人选择最有效率的行动。由此建立模型,通过规范的理论分析,检验了过度自信对投资动态和公司价值的影响。表明过度自信的代理人会增加投资和财务宽松;投资者以较低的薪酬就可以激励过度自信的代理人更加努力工作,这样公司的总价值不变,代理人的部分财富转移到投资者手中。
Based on the dynamic investment theory and the optimal contract, this paper relaxes the hypothesis that the agent is a rational person, believing that the agent is overconfident and overestimates his ability and output. Investors, on the other hand, are rational and can make optimal contracts based on their overconfidence and motivate agents to choose the most efficient actions with the lowest possible incentive costs. From this, we establish a model to test the impact of overconfidence on investment dynamics and company value through the normative theoretical analysis. Indicating that overconfident agents increase investment and financial easing; Investors can motivate overconfident agents to work harder with lower wages, so that the total value of the firm remains constant and part of the agent’s wealth is transferred to investors .