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寡头三级价格歧视是否会成为支配企业排斥市场进入的策略工具是价格歧视理论尚未解决的问题,并影响了反垄断执法审查。本文采用具有固定进入成本和不对称竞争的在位者—进入者模型并考虑政府政策干预影响来分析寡头三级价格歧视的进入阻止效应,结果显示:只有在进入成本中等的情况下,三级价格歧视才会产生伤害社会福利排他效应,在进入成本较低和较高的情况下,三级价格歧视通常提高社会总福利。在进入需要支付固定成本的情况下,进入者的进入竞争并不一定与福利提高相一致,政府禁止价格歧视尽管可能会有利于进入,但往往会恶化社会福利。因此,政府应谨慎禁止寡头企业三级价格歧视行为,只有在进入成本中等且价格歧视导致“同等有效率竞争者”被封锁时才应介入。对市场封锁性三级价格歧视的反垄断审查应该充分考虑市场进入固定成本的高低、强市场与弱市场的相对规模、市场容量、产品替代性程度等因素。
Whether Oligopolistic Three-Price Discrimination Will Become a Strategic Tool That Dominate Enterprise Exclusion from Market Entry is an unresolved issue of the theory of price discrimination and affects the antitrust enforcement review. In this paper, we use the fixed entrants-entrants model with fixed cost of entry and asymmetric competition and analyze the effect of the blockade on the entry barriers of the oligarchs’ price discrimination. The results show that only at medium cost of entry, Price discrimination will have an injurious effect on the exclusion of social welfare. At lower and higher entry costs, the third-level price discrimination usually increases the total social welfare. Entry into competition requiring entitlement to pay entrants does not necessarily coincide with the increase in entitlement to entry, and the prohibition of price discrimination by the government, although likely to facilitate entry, tends to worsen social welfare. Therefore, the government should prudently prohibit third-level price discrimination of oligopolistic enterprises and should only intervene if they enter the medium-cost and price discrimination results in the blockade of “equivalent efficient competitors.” The antitrust review of the three-level price discrimination on the market blockade should take full account of the factors such as the market entry level of fixed costs, the relative size of strong and weak markets, market capacity and the degree of product substitution.