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本文针对零售商销售努力和销售价格影响需求情况下的制造商-零售商两级供应链,研究不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链的分散决策。基于博弈理论和建模方法,对几种权力结构和信息结构情景建立相应模型,通过理论与数值分析对不同博弈均衡进行比较。研究表明,随着零售商势力逐步增强制造商利润会逐步恶化;但零售商势力增强能否带来更多利润,取决于需求对价格和销售努力的敏感度、销售努力成本以及信息结构。占优一方可以通过获取对方更多信息来改善自己处境。若占优零售商不得不依赖于对制造商成本先验分布进行决策,当估计的均值大于真实成本时,适度的方差对零售商更有利。最后,讨论了销售努力成本分担的合作机制,针对非合作博弈给出了帕累托改进的合约区间和Nash讨价还价均衡。
This paper aims at the manufacturer-retailer two-level supply chain under the influence of retailers’ sales efforts and sales prices, and studies the decentralized supply chain decision-making under different channels of power structure and information structure. Based on game theory and modeling method, several models of power structure and information structure are established, and the equilibrium of different games is compared through theoretical and numerical analysis. Research shows that manufacturers’ profits will gradually deteriorate as the retailers’ forces gradually increase. However, whether the retailers’ power can make more profits depends on the sensitivity of demand to prices and sales efforts, the cost of sales efforts, and the structure of information. The dominant party can improve one’s situation by getting more information from each other. If the dominant retailer has to rely on a priori distribution of manufacturer costs, the modest variance is more favorable to the retailer when the average of the estimates is greater than the true cost. Finally, the cooperation mechanism of cost-sharing in sales efforts is discussed, and Pareto-improved contract interval and Nash bargaining equilibrium are given for non-cooperative game.