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本文以Aghion和Stein(2008)的多维任务模型为基础,引入两层次代理关系,考察了委托人推断代理人能力对企业内部管理者激励和行为的影响。分析表明,外部投资者推断管理者能力会引导后者迎合外部投资者的要求来配置资源和精力,从而扭曲企业内部管理者的激励和行为,降低企业内部资本市场创造的经济价值。本文分析强调,其一,企业子部门在多维任务相对重要性方面的差异越大,多层次代理关系下的激励失当和行为扭曲的可能性及扭曲程度越增大;其二,为了降低企业内部管理者精力配置扭曲导致的效率损失,追求企业价值最大化的CEO倾向于增强对现期绩效的激励程度,降低对将来显现绩效的激励力度,这导致了与高层次代理人(CEO)相比,低层次代理人(子部门经理)更加关注现在而相对忽略长期绩效。
Based on the multidimensional task model of Aghion and Stein (2008), this paper introduces the two-level agency relationship and examines the influence of the agent’s ability to infer the manager’s motivation and behavior in the enterprise. The analysis shows that the external investors infer that the manager’s ability will guide the latter to meet the requirements of external investors to allocate resources and energy, thus distorting the incentives and behaviors of the internal managers and reducing the economic value created by the internal capital markets. The analysis of this article emphasizes that firstly, the bigger the difference in the relative importance of multidimensional tasks is, the more likely and distorted the incentive misconduct and behavior distortions in the multi-level agency relationship will be. Second, in order to reduce the internal Managers allocate energy distortions caused by distortions, and CEOs seeking maximum corporate value tend to be more motivated by current performance and less motivated by perceived performance in the future, resulting in higher-level proxies (CEOs) , Low-level agents (sub-department managers) pay more attention to the present and ignore the long-term performance relatively.