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在司法实践大量运用推定的方法认定故意的情形下,很多学者致力于构建更完善的推定规则。但问题在于既然明知这种推定标准低于直接的证明标准,那么推定故意的合理性就值得怀疑。进而为故意的推定不断设定的标准是否必要。本文认为,在“事实清楚,证据确实充分”的标准之下不应再设定任何证明标准或推定规则,应采用诠释学循环的原理,结合个案的全部材料对个案的故意进行认定,从而避免走入僵化、教条的误区。
Under the circumstance that the judicatory practice uses a large number of presumptive methods to determine intentionality, many scholars devote themselves to constructing more perfect presumption rules. The problem, however, is that the presumption of intentional reasonableness is doubtful given that such presumption of presumption is clearly below the direct proof. It is then necessary to deliberately presume that the ever-setting standards are not set. This paper argues that no proof standard or presumption rule should be set up under the criterion of “the facts are clear and the evidence is sufficient”, the principle of hermeneutics cycle should be adopted, and all the materials of the case should be used to identify the case intentionally. So as to avoid going into the rigid, dogmatic errors.